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Abstract 
Suspicious transaction reporting (STR) is a cornerstone of the international Anti-
Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
framework. The evaluation of AML/CFT regimes is challenging, however, as the 
quality of STRs varies substantially between countries and little is known about the 
factors that drive STR. In combining legal and economic analyses, this article 
evaluates various factors that potentially explain STR levels. The analysis of the 
AML/CFT legislation in nine jurisdictions reveals that well-established legal and 
institutional structures promote the effectiveness of STR systems. In particular, the 
legal analysis shows that the scope of predicate offenses in national criminal law, 
as well as a penalty regime for non-compliance with the obligations under national 
AML/CFT legislation, seem to increase the quantity of STRs. Overly strict penalty 
regimes and insufficient training of entities with reporting obligations, on the other 
hand, likely stimulate over-reporting. Based on these findings, we econometrically 
investigate potential determinants of STR levels for 54 countries from 2006 to 2012. 
We find that high STR numbers indicate high levels of illegal activities such as 
terrorism and organized crime. Moreover, mutual evaluations of countries’ 
AML/CFT frameworks entail a short-term increase in the number of STRs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Combining legal and econometric methods, this paper analyses suspicious 
transaction reporting levels. While the number of these reports differs substantially 
between countries, little is known about the factors that explain a given level of 
reporting. In identifying and analysing a broad set of legal and economic factors 
that potentially contribute to countries’ reporting levels, this article aims to facilitate 
the evaluation of suspicious transaction reporting schemes. 
In response to the growing threat of global terrorism, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF)6 initiated the development of a global standard of policy and legal 
measures to fight money laundering, terrorist financing and the proliferation of 
weapons (hereinafter the FATF Standard) (FATF, 2012). FATF Recommendation 
20 proposes the introduction of a reporting standard that requires national financial 
intelligence units (FIUs) to report suspicious transactions related to criminal 
activity or terrorist financing. Depending on national legislation, these suspicions 
usually take the form of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) or suspicious activity 
reports (SARs). 
The efficiency of STR systems depends on two factors: the quality of reports and 
the administrative capacity to detect and prosecute criminal activity. Both factors, 
however, rely on the implementation of several legislative and bureaucratic 
provisions (Roule & Kinsell, 2003). Therefore, periodic evaluations of the degree 
to which jurisdictions are compliant with the FATF Standard are an integral part of 
the global anti-money laundering/combating of the financing of terrorism 
(hereinafter AML/CFT) framework. Mutual evaluations are conducted by financial 
experts and found to be objective and consistent (Chaikin, 2009). Moreover, when 
conducting mutual evaluations of AML/CFT regimes, the question often arises as 
to what an adequate level of such reporting might be. As reporting entities are held 
liable for the consequences of money laundering, FIUs often receive a large number 
of unfounded STRs (e.g. Johnston & Carrington, 2006; KPMG, 2003), which 
makes the FIUs’ evaluation particularly important.7 Experience of the assessors has 
shown that the number of STRs could range from hundreds a year to thousands a 
day. Against this background, it is very difficult to make any meaningful and 
informed judgment about whether or not a given level of reporting is adequate in a 
country’s particular context. However, in order to facilitate the evaluation of FIUs 
efforts in fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism, a better 
understanding of the effectiveness of STR schemes and the factors that drive 
reporting levels is much needed. 
                                                 
6 The FATF is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its member 
jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation 
of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing 
and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. 
7 FIUs often forward only a small fraction of STRs filed to law enforcement agencies and sometimes 
several thousand STRs refer to one money laundering case (e.g. see EUROSTAT, 2013). 
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While it should be acknowledged that direct comparisons between different 
countries are not feasible due to each country’s unique circumstances (legal, 
financial, etc.), we assume that some factors may contribute to and explain a given 
level of reporting. In combining legal and economic analyses, this article aims to 
evaluate various factors that potentially explain STR levels. Improving the 
effectiveness of AML/CFT regimes is crucial as global terrorism and international 
money laundering remain significant threats to political stability and economic 
prosperity in many regions of the world. 
Our main findings are threefold. First, the legal analysis reveals that the scope of 
predicate offenses in national legislation and a dissuasive penalty regime for non-
compliance with national AML/CFT regimes seems to increase the number of 
STRs. On the other hand, insufficient training of reporting entities, as well as overly 
severe penalties for non-compliance with reporting standards are likely to promote 
over-reporting. Second, the econometric analysis shows that illegal activities, 
particularly terrorism and organized crime, trigger high levels of STRs. Third, both 
legal and economic analyses find evidence that mutual evaluations increase the 
number of STRs. 
In line with earlier research on the effects of FATF membership on money 
laundering in the banking sector (Johnson & Lim, 2003)8, these findings suggest 
that the FATF Recommendations facilitate the detection of criminal activity related 
to terrorist financing and money laundering when implemented appropriately. 
Moreover, we observe that STR is particularly effective when embedded in sound 
legal structures with a broad scope of predicate offenses. Despite the resources 
required to build and maintain capacity to detect suspicious activities, the FATF 
Recommendations appear to play a crucial role in fighting global terrorism. 
However, as we find the number of STRs to be closely linked to mutual evaluations, 
mutual evaluation schemes should incorporate risk considerations. This would help 
monitoring jurisdictions that are vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist 
financing more effectively. 
The next section describes the STR requirements as set out in the FATF 
Recommendations. We subsequently investigate legal and institutional factors that 
affect STR levels and discuss the effectiveness of different reporting standards in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we assess the effects of various economic and institutional 
factors on STR levels. Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
8 While Johnson & Lim (2003) find that countries exhibit less money laundering activity in the 
banking sector after joining the FATF relative to non-FATF members, they do not investigate 
whether the FATF aggravates the money laundering problem in non-member states when illicit 
activity is relocated to non-FATF countries. Also, their research design does not allow identifying 
the direct effects of FATF membership on money laundering activity. 
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International standards in suspicious transaction reporting 
Suspicious transaction reporting is the backbone of preventive measures under the 
FATF Standard. Specifically, the FATF recommends legal provisions that require 
financial institutions (FIs)9 and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions10 to report certain transactions to their national financial intelligence 
units (FIUs). The most relevant recommendation in this respect is Recommendation 
20, which reads as follows:  
“If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to 
terrorist financing, it should be required, by law, to report promptly its 
suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU).” (FATF, 2012, p. 
21) 
The interpretative note to Recommendation 20 clarifies its scope (FATF, 2012, p. 
80). Criminal activity under this recommendation should be understood as any 
                                                 
9 The term “Financial institutions” under the FATF Recommendations 2012 has a broad meaning 
and includes both natural and legal persons who are engaged in a business encompassing, or carry 
out on behalf of the customer, one or more of the following activities: (i) acceptance of deposits and 
other repayable funds from the public; (ii) lending, (iii) financial leasing, (iv) money or value 
transfer services, (v) issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, 
traveller's cheques, money orders and bankers' drafts, electronic money), (vi) financial guarantees 
and commitments, (vii) trading in money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, 
derivatives etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable 
securities, commodity futures trading, (viii) participation in securities issues and the provision of 
financial services related to such issues, (ix) individual and collective portfolio management, (x) 
safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of  other persons, (xi) otherwise 
investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons, (xii) underwriting 
and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance, (xiii) money and currency 
changing. The FATF Recommendations 2012 are available online at:  
http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf. 
10 Under the FATF Recommendations the term “Designated non-financial businesses and 
professions” is defined with an exhaustive list of subject persons that are expected to have an 
increased probability to be exposed to the proceeds of crime in their regular professional activity or 
business: (i) casinos, (ii) real estate agents, (iii) dealers in precious metals, (iv) dealers in precious 
stones, (v) lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – this refers to 
sole practitioners, partners or employed professionals within professional firms. It does not refer to 
‘internal’ professionals that are employees of other types of businesses, nor to professionals working 
for government agencies, who may already be subject to AML/CFT measures, (vi) trust and 
company service providers refers to all persons or businesses that are not covered elsewhere under 
these Recommendations, and which as a business, provide any of the following services to third 
parties (a) acting as a formation agent of legal persons, (b) acting as (or arranging for another person 
to act as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in 
relation to other legal persons, (c) providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, 
correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or 
arrangement, (d) acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust or 
performing the equivalent function for another form of legal arrangement, (e) acting as (or arranging 
for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person. Further, it should be noted 
that designated non-financial businesses and professions have been included in the FATF 
Recommendations in 2003. The FATF Recommendations 2003 are available online at: 
http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202003.pdf. 
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predicate offense for money laundering as defined by the national laws of the 
individual countries. The FATF provides for a minimum list of offenses which 
should be covered by national AML/CFT legislation and be included in the 
definition of the predicate crimes for money laundering or terrorist financing.11  
However, not all offenses falling in one of the designated crime categories have to 
be covered by the reporting requirement. FATF Recommendations12 defining the 
scope of predicate offences for money laundering and terrorist financing are closely 
related to the STR framework. Recommendation 3 “Money Laundering Offence”13 
and Recommendation 5 “Terrorist Financing Offence”14 outline the minimum 
scope of crimes that countries should include in their national AML/CTF regimes. 
From the wording of Recommendation 3, it is possible to derive that national laws 
have to define a threshold for predicate offenses that constitute serious crimes. An 
exception is made for terrorist financing as the “serious crime” threshold is 
omitted. Furthermore, it is stressed that terrorist financing should be understood in 
a comprehensive manner. This means financing of terrorist acts does not need to be 
linked to a specific terrorist act or acts to be considered as such (FATF, 2012, p. 
80). All suspicious transactions must be reported to the FIUs, whether they have 
been carried out or just attempted (FATF, 2012, p. 80). 
Although the FATF Recommendations do not constitute a legally binding 
instrument under international law, they have been globally recognized and 
therefore can be considered to be soft international law (Terry, 2010). In order to 
comply with the FATF Standard countries are expected to implement the FATF 
Recommendations in their national legal systems in compliance with a regular 
procedure laid down in their constitutional laws. Avoiding prescriptive provisions 
in the FATF Recommendations helps to provide for a flexible base that can be 
adapted to the legislative and legal specifics of each country. Such flexibility allows 
for a broad spectrum of designs and interpretation of the FATF Standard in the 
national institutional and legal AML/CFT frameworks. The enforcement of the 
FATF Standard is ensured by on-site visits and off-site reviews of the 
documentation provided by reviewees. Mutual evaluations are conducted by 
                                                 
11 A list of designated offenses under the FATF Recommendations 2012 includes the following 
categories of offenses: participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering, terrorism, 
including terrorist financing, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, sexual 
exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, illicit arms trafficking, illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods, 
corruption and bribery, fraud, counterfeiting currency, counterfeiting and piracy of products, 
environmental crime, murder, grievous bodily injury, kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-
taking, robbery or theft, smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes), 
tax crimes (related to direct taxes and indirect taxes), extortion, forgery, piracy, and insider trading 
and market manipulation.  
12 Other recommendations also may have influence on the STR reporting frameworks, but in the 
authors’ opinion their impact is rather indirect. Therefore, the focus of the legal analysis will be on 
the above-mentioned three recommendations with some references to other potential influencing 
factors.   
13 Old numbering: Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2. 
14 Old numbering: Special Recommendation II. 
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assessors who are appointed either directly by FATF, or by connected 
organizations, such as the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), the Asia/Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering (APG) and the other FATF-like regional bodies. 
Legal analysis 
Introduction 
Since the FATF Recommendations do not constitute a legally binding instrument 
under international law, jurisdictions may choose their own legal and institutional 
models in order to implement the FATF Standard. Given a broad variety of possible 
legal and institutional frameworks which may be implemented by jurisdictions, 
nothing else may be expected but a slighter or major deviation from the 
international standard. 
With the aim of identifying relevant features in legal and institutional frameworks 
that may have affected STR levels, we focus our analysis on two contrasting groups 
of countries from the sample surveyed in the economic analysis. STR to GDP ratios 
rather than absolute figures are referred to in order to distinguish high and low-
reporting countries for the purpose of reviewing legal and institutional frameworks. 
Particularly, we focus on the three countries with very high (Thailand, Latvia, 
Georgia) and four countries with the very low (Qatar, Switzerland, Germany, and 
Austria) STR/GDP ratios, while also accounting for practices from other interesting 
jurisdictions such as Mexico (medium STR/GDP levels) and Liechtenstein.15 By 
reviewing the mutual evaluation reports (MERs) which are publicly available on 
the FATF or FATF-like bodies’ websites, an attempt is made to identify changes in 
legal systems or institutional measures which could have affected STR levels in the 
period from 2006 to 2012. 
Scope of the predicate offenses under domestic laws 
In accordance with Recommendation 20, when deciding whether to report a 
suspicious transaction or activity, first of all, the entity or person has to identify 
whether a transaction has any potential connection with proceeds derived from 
committing a predicate crime. Thus, the number of reported transactions clearly 
depends on the scope of the definitions of money laundering and terrorist financing 
in national laws. It is hence plausible to expect that countries that define money 
laundering in a broad sense by including in its definition the whole range of 
designated crimes can be expected to have high STR levels. This assumption seems 
to be confirmed when looking at the countries with low STR/GDP levels. 
As depicted in Appendix A, Qatar was the country with the lowest STR/GDP ratio 
in the timespan analysed. Indeed, the scope of money laundering offences was very 
                                                 
15 Until 2009, the OECD considered Liechtenstein as an uncooperative tax haven. 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/liechtenstein/listofunco-operativetaxhavens.htm. 
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narrowly drafted and accordingly criticized by the assessors in the MER of 2008. 
At that time under Qatari AML law, money laundering offenses did not cover acts 
aimed at concealing or disguising the location, disposition, movement, or 
ownership of funds and the list was further narrowed by adopting a list of predicate 
crimes substantially shorter than that of FATF-designated offences. Pursuant to this 
list, only crimes involving drugs and dangerous psychotropic substances, forgery 
and counterfeiting, and imitations of notes and coins, illegal trafficking of weapons, 
ammunition and explosives, terrorist crimes, and extortion and looting were 
considered to constitute crimes predicated to money laundering (MENAFATF, 
2008, p. 9). As a result of these and other deficiencies Qatar was placed in a regular 
follow-up process (MENAFATF, 2012, p. 1). The deficiencies related to the scope 
of money laundering offence were removed in 2010 (MENAFATF, 2012, p. 2). 
Accordingly, the number of STRs significantly increased in 2010.16 
Switzerland, the country with the second lowest STR/GDP in our sample, in 2005 
had a definition of predicate offenses with a limited scope, which did not include 
four categories of predicate offenses specified by the FATF (human trafficking, 
piracy and counterfeiting, smuggling, insider trading and market abuse) (FATF, 
2005, p. 13). The first three categories were addressed at the time of the follow-up 
report and the last one was partly dealt with (FATF, 2009, p. 16). The analysis of 
Swiss laws revealed that there was no requirement to file an STR if no relationship 
with the customer had been established due to failed negotiations. Furthermore, 
Swiss law required that a person filing a STR had a well-founded suspicion – a 
threshold that demands more verification from the person reporting a transaction 
than prescribed by the FATF Recommendations. 
In the case of Germany the assessors noted in the 2010 MER that the concept of 
“suspicious transaction” was defined in a very narrow way. Its scope related only 
to money laundering and not generally to the proceeds from criminal activity 
(FATF, 2010, p. 165). Moreover, this definition required a much higher certainty 
threshold than is intended by the wording “suspects or has reasonable grounds to 
suspect” provided in the FATF Recommendations. National law indicated that the 
requirement of near-certainty had to be met before filing the report. Additionally, 
given that the German FIU was organized in the form of a police unit and STRs 
were submitted to criminal investigation authorities, STRs represented criminal 
complaints instead of constituting a preventive measure (Cindori, 2013). 
An interesting example is represented by Thailand - the country with the highest 
STR/GDP ratio in our sample. The high ratio of reports in Thailand is not a 
concomitant of the definition of money laundering, but is rather attributable to 
inefficiencies of its AML/CFT framework (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 
168). In fact, Thailand was rated as being partly compliant with Recommendation 
                                                 
16 This effect cannot be entirely attributed to the extension of the scope of predicate crimes, but 
should rather be seen as the result of comprehensive AML/CFT framework reform requested by the 
MENAFATF.  
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1 and Recommendation 2 (now Recommendation 3) in the 2007 MER, where it was 
asked to extend the scope of predicate offences. Thailand is rather an exception, 
since its high reporting levels may be explained by deficiencies of its legal and 
institutional frameworks that are explained in more detail in Section 3.5. 
On the other hand, a broad definition of money laundering crimes can lead to more 
adequate STR levels An example is Latvia,17 where the level of STRs was low due 
to the fact that reporting entities deliberately complied with the AML/CFT 
framework in a very lax way (Moneyval, 2006, p. 7). Reporting levels improved, 
however, after regulatory reforms were undertaken in order to address international 
objections and to restore trust in the financial sector. 
Penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations 
Sanction regimes for non-compliance with reporting obligations are central 
elements of AML/CTF regimes. In line with traditional economic theory, the cross-
country analysis supports the assumption that high penalties imposed on non-
compliant entities can work as a dissuasive factor and increase the level of STRs 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). 
Low sanctions or no fines effectively imposed seem to affect STR levels negatively. 
The problem of insufficiently dissuasive sanctions is common to many countries 
with low reporting levels. For example, in the 2008 MER of Qatar the assessors 
have highlighted that the Qatari AML law did not provide for sanctions for failure 
to report suspicious transactions (MENAFATF, 2008, p. 138). Furthermore, no 
institutions were sanctioned for non-compliance with AML law (MENAFATF, 
2008, p. 140). Subsequent to this critique Qatari laws were amended and penalties 
were increased, and additional administrative sanctions were introduced 
(MENAFATF, 2012, p. 16). In fact, the number of STRs reported in 2010 compared 
to the 2009 figures increased more than two times. 
Also in the case of Georgia, STR levels increased substantially due to the stricter 
regulatory pressure by the National Bank of Georgia on the financial sector. In fact, 
the number of STRs more than doubled in 2010 compared to 2009. However, at the 
same time financial institutions interviewed by the assessors have revealed that the 
substantial increase in STRs was a signal of defensive over-reporting following 
inspections carried out by the Georgian National Bank and penalties imposed as a 
result of those inspections rather than a sign of effective identification of suspicion 
(Moneyval, 2012, pp. 194-195). 
 
                                                 
17 The first MER completed in 2001 already stated that “Latvia has taken a number of significant 
steps to counter money laundering. They have put together a very comprehensive structure for the 
protection of the financial system in a regime based on suspicious and unusual transaction reporting, 
the latter with a range of different reporting thresholds for various institutions” (Moneyval, 2001, p. 
2). 
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In Thailand, persons subject to reporting faced a lack of feedback or guidance on 
how to detect suspicious transactions or which circumstances might indicate the 
possibility that transactions have an underlying ML/FT purpose (International 
Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 168). On the other hand, high sanctions and penalties for 
non-compliance, which in the AML/CFT framework always means the failure to 
report a suspicious transaction, tended to fortify further the tendency to file STRs 
without a well-grounded suspicion. Given the high level of uncertainty with respect 
to their obligations, financial entities reported more suspicious transactions than 
necessary (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 168). 
 
Visits of Evaluators and Regulatory Pressure 
Generally, the analysis of the majority of MERs proves that on-site visits of the 
assessors play a significant role in triggering the reforms necessary to bring the 
legal system of a particular country in line with the FATF Standard and increase 
the number of meaningful STRs. One of the most salient examples is Latvia. Being 
caught in the midst of the scandals revolving around its financial sector in 2005 and 
subject to heightened international attention,18 including that of AML/CFT 
framework assessors, Latvia had to introduce a range of legislative, institutional 
and administrative measures to rehabilitate the image of its financial sector. 
Furthermore, authorities have undertaken extensive inspections at the financial 
institution; as a result, at one point 13 of 23 Latvian financial institutions were under 
intensified supervision due to AML/CTF deficiencies.  It was expected that 
deficiencies identified during this period were to be substantially addressed by the 
end of 2005. As a result of these reforms and intensified pressure on the financial 
sector by the national authorities, the numbers of suspicious and unusual 
transactions reports have increased in the period of the reforms and kept on growing 
several years thereafter. Figure 1 represents the dynamics of the reporting levels in 
Latvia between 2000 and 2010 (the data are taken from Moneyval, 2012, p. 77). 
The 2012 MER underlined Latvia’s substantial progress in improving its AML/CFT 
system. However, it was still rated as partially compliant with a range of 
recommendations concerning the establishment of client risk profiles and STR 
(Moneyval, 2006, p. 245).  Generally, in countries with low reporting levels visits 
of assessors led to an increase of STRs due to the reforms that had to be 
implemented in order to comply with the observations made in the MERs (also see 
Section 4). 
 
Efficiency of AML/CFT Frameworks 
High levels of STRs do not automatically indicate that the AML/CFT system is 
entirely compliant with the FATF Standard. In 2008, Mexico’s MER detected a 
long list of deficiencies in its AML/CFT framework, among which an 
                                                 
18 The US Treasury made a proposal for classifying two Latvian banks as posing major concern for 
money laundering for the purposes of the US law (Moneyval, 2006,  p. 7). 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:1 2016                                            Drivers of Suspicious Transaction Reporting Levels 
 
104 
 
overwhelming quantity of low quality STRs (FATF, 2008, pp. 184-185). The latter 
deficiency was not only identified by the assessors, but also acknowledged by the 
Mexican authorities. STRs peaked in 2005, and then started to decrease due to 
efforts undertaken to increase the quality of the reports. It is interesting to note that 
although the quantity of STRs was high, Mexico did not make use of the STRs filed 
by some participants on the financial market, for example bonding companies, 
registered money transmitters and currency exchanges (FATF, 2014b, pp. 20-21). 
 
Figure 1. Suspicious and unusual transactions reported in Latvia in 2000- 2010 
 
 
The high level of reporting in Thailand could also to some extent be attributed to 
an inefficient AML/CFT system. According to the 2007 IMF report, many of the 
reports filed were of poor quality (p. 168). In particular, the cash transaction 
reporting threshold triggering the identification obligation seemed problematic. An 
analysis of reporting patterns revealed that reporting entities tended to submit 
reports for transactions that exceeded this threshold without due diligence. On the 
other hand, transactions below the threshold were seemingly not properly 
scrutinised by financial institutions, as the low number of STRs referring to these 
transactions indicates (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 168). Therefore, in its 
2007 review the IMF concluded that the over-reporting in Thailand could inter alia 
result from a misinterpretation of the reporting obligations (International Monetary 
Fund, 2007, p. 168). 
Exposure of Reporting Entities 
Another important element that could be noted in the countries with low reporting 
levels is the exposure of reporting entities filing the STR and the status of STR 
itself. Countries where reporting entities were excessively exposed to the attention 
of criminal authorities exhibited the tendency to have low reporting levels. In 
Liechtenstein the FIU was obliged to submit all suspicious activity reports to the 
prosecutor’s office. This could negatively affect the willingness of financial 
institutions to file such reports (Moneyval, 2014, p. 12). Similar issues with the 
exposure of institutions obliged to reporting were also found in Austria. Under 
national law, the STRs constituted an instrument similar to a criminal complaint, 
meaning that the suspect or defendant had a right to access all the files including 
the relevant STRs after the end of proceedings. That made them a self-limiting 
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factor for reporting entities (FATF, 2014a, p. 12). A similar weakness was revealed 
in the German regime, where the reporting entity had to have a relatively high 
degree of certainty regarding the money laundering offense before filing a STR. 
Moreover, the reports had to be filed with the state criminal investigation 
authorities. As a result, the reports were perceived as criminal complaints rather 
than indicators of suspicious transactions (FATF, 2010, p. 12). 
Secrecy provisions  
Although bank and professional secrecy provisions in many jurisdictions have been 
removed or relaxed due to international pressure from the G20, the FATF and the 
OECD, they still seem to negatively impact the STR levels in several countries.  
In 2014, it was underlined that Liechtenstein was still constrained by its national 
secrecy regulations. Austria also applied strict bank secrecy rules to information 
retained by banks. Moreover, there were restrictions on the FIU’s access to 
information. However, following the legislative changes undertaken in 2010 and 
2012, the follow-up report of 2014 up-graded Austria’s legislation and considered 
it to be largely compliant with Recommendation 9 “Financial Institution Secrecy 
Laws” (FATF, 2014a, p. 5). 
The 2010 MER criticized the German framework for having a carve-out provision 
for legal privilege and professional secrecy. Lawyers were exempted from their 
reporting obligations in instances where information on suspicious transactions was 
obtained while providing legal advice or while defending clients at court.19 The 
negative implications of this exemption on reporting levels were enhanced by a 
broad interpretation of the legal advice definition. For instance, notaries claimed 
that almost all of their activities were considered to involve an element of legal 
advice, since attesting to the correctness of documents includes determining 
whether the terms of contracts and other documents are legally correct. The secrecy 
policy in Germany was further strengthened by the possibility to transmit STRs to 
competent federal chambers. Nevertheless, according to German chambers’ 
representatives, this latter aspect did not play a significant role as STRs were 
forwarded promptly to the relevant authorities (FATF, 2010, p. 225). 
This section has shown that differences in legal AML/CFT frameworks and the role 
of FIUs strongly affect STR levels. More specifically, the country studies have 
illustrated that (i) the scope of predicate offense under domestic laws, (ii) non-
compliance with reporting obligations, (iii) the visits of evaluators and regulatory 
pressure, (iv) the efficiency of AML/CFT frameworks, (v) the exposure of reporting 
entities, and (vi) secrecy provisions in domestic law have an impact on STR levels. 
Acknowledging these very different legal frameworks, the next section broadens 
                                                 
19 There was an exception to this regulation. The carve–out was not effective if it was certain that a 
client deliberately used legal advice for the purpose of ML or TF. 
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the perspective and analyses the effects of various economic and political factors 
that potentially drive STR levels. 
Economic analysis of the drivers of STR levels 
Introduction 
This section aims at identifying factors that affect countries’ STR in order to 
facilitate the determination of adequate reporting levels. Little is known about the 
determinants of reporting levels and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of STR 
schemes is rare. However, as there is broad consensus that money laundering and 
terrorist financing pose pressing political challenges, it is essential to establish 
reporting systems that facilitate effective prosecution. As the number of 
transactions reported varies significantly between countries and reporting 
obligations pose a substantial burden for financial and political institutions, a better 
understanding of the factors that drive reporting levels is much needed. 
This section, therefore, provides an exploratory analysis of the effects of a broad 
range of political and economic factors on countries’ reporting levels. Generally, a 
theoretical framework that allows evaluating the adequateness of reporting 
standards is missing and it seems questionable whether an effective reporting 
system is characterized by a high number of STRs. In a first step we thus develop a 
set of hypotheses and describe the data (Section 4.2). Subsequently, we regress 
national reporting levels on selected key factors in order to identify their respective 
effects on STR levels (Section 4.3). The findings are then discussed and 
summarized in Section 4.4. 
Descriptive Data Analysis and Hypotheses Development 
Since its founding in 1989, the FATF expanded to its current 36 members. It 
moreover cooperates closely with several associate members and observer 
organizations.20 However, despite the FATF’s general recommendation to publish 
suspicious activity reports annually, most financial intelligence units of associated 
member states do not provide comprehensive access to information on STRs. Our 
sample is thus restricted to countries that publish annual reports or grant access to 
data on reporting levels.21  
In total, we consider 54 countries22 during the period from 2006 to 2012. Generally, 
countries’ reporting levels vary dramatically. They range from 63 STRs in Malta 
(2009) to over 1.5 million SARs in the United States (2012).23 
                                                 
20 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/. 
21 These figures can for instance be retrieved from 
http://www.fiba.net/pages/FinancialIntelligenceUnits/. 
22 Countries that provided information on STRs are listed in Appendix A. 
23 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are generally defined more broadly than STRs, as they 
include various activities that violate criminal law. 
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Figure 2 shows the total number of STRs (in thousands) over the period analysed. 
The number increased steadily from 1.38 million in 2006 to above 3.4 million in 
2010. After this spike in 2010, we observe a small decrease in the following two 
years, with the total number of STRs remaining above three million. For 2012, our 
data comprises a total of 3.06 million reported STRs (SARs). With 1.58 million 
STRs, the lion’s share of these STRs/SARs was reported by the United States 
(51.9% of total reports). Other important reporting countries were Japan, South 
Korea, and the United Kingdom, each with more than 250,000 STRs in 2012. 
Clearly, the high overall number of STRs/SARs is driven by a small number of 
countries. In 2012, the first eight countries together reported more than 90% of all 
STRs. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate country-specific characteristics of 
the enforcement regime (see Section 3). In order to facilitate the comparison 
between different countries that adopted AML/CTF schemes, we additionally 
evaluate the effect of several macro-economic factors on reporting levels. Appendix 
B provides an overview of the variables considered in our analysis. 
Figure 2: Total number of STRs (in thousands) from 2006 to 2012 in the sample of 54 countries 
 
To start with, the economic size of a country seems an obvious determinant of 
varying STR levels among countries. Particularly the larger size of the financial 
sector may trigger more STRs. Indeed, a simple scatterplot illustrates that the 
number of STRs is positively correlated with the economic size of a country 
(measured in GDP) (Figure 3). Given this positive correlation, we “normalize” the 
number of STRs by the GDP of the respective country. We can thus analyse how 
specific factors affect the ratio of reports to GDP.  
Figure 4 depicts the (natural logarithm of the) average ratio of STR/GDP between 
2006 and 2012. Apart from a small decline in 2007, the average ratio of STR to 
GDP has increased steadily since 2006, exhibiting a relatively steep rise between 
2007 and 2010 and a slower increase in the years after. 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:1 2016                                            Drivers of Suspicious Transaction Reporting Levels 
 
108 
 
Figure 3: The number of STRs(ln) plotted against the GDP(ln) in the 54 sample countries 
between 2006 and 2012 
 
Figure 4: The average ratio of STR to GDP (ln) of the 54 sample countries between 2006 and 
201
 
As little is known about the effects of those factors on countries reporting levels 
and it is often not clear how they affect STR, we develop a broad set of hypotheses 
that cover various economic and institutional factors. 
First, we expect the level of economic development and general institutional factors 
to influence reporting levels. A state’s stability, its capacity to fight corruption, and 
the size of the shadow economy likely determine suspicious activity. For instance, 
Puffer, McCarthy & Jaeger (2016) argue that institution building in emerging 
economies is key in fighting corruption, and Vaithilingam & Nair (2007) find less 
money laundering activity in countries with strong institutional capacity, effective 
legal and regulatory frameworks, and efficient governance structures. On the other 
hand, while a large degree of corruption, for instance, potentially triggers a lot of 
suspicious activity that translates into a high number of STRs, a corrupt system 
4
6
8
10
12
14
ln
(S
TR
)
22 24 26 28 30
ln(GDP)
-4
.4
-4
.2
-4
-3
.8
-3
.6
ST
R
/G
DP
(ln
)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
year
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:1 2016                                            Drivers of Suspicious Transaction Reporting Levels 
 
109 
 
might also undermine reporting standards and thus reduce the number of reports 
filed. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H1: General institutional factors affect STR levels (direction unclear). 
Second, we assume that the depth and internationality of a country’s financial sector 
impacts STR levels. We would expect that the larger this share of international 
activity in total banking activity is, the higher the risk for suspicious transactions 
taking place and being reported. The financial sector variables also capture that the 
place of financing of the criminal activity may differ from the place where the 
underlying criminal activity actually takes place. 
H2: Depth and internationality of the financial sector increase the number 
of STRs.  
Third, we conjecture that financial sector regulation influences STR levels. 
Restrictions on bank activity and the strength of official supervisory power, for 
instance, could have positive or negative effects on reporting levels. Therefore, we 
assume that 
H3: Financial sector regulation affects STR levels (direction unclear). 
Fourth, we expect that FATF membership increases STR levels. While little is 
known about the costs and benefits of AML/CFT regimes (Halliday, Levi & Reuter, 
2014), FATF membership indicates a political commitment that might ultimately 
result in high numbers of STRs. In line with our findings from Section 3.4., we 
moreover expect on-site visits and MERs to increase STR levels, as they facilitate 
and supervise the implementation of FATF standards. It follows that 
H4: FATF membership and mutual evaluations increase STR levels. 
Fifth, we hypothesize that criminal activities drive reporting levels. Given that well-
targeted reporting systems successfully identify criminal activities, countries with 
high crime-rates should file more STRs. Thus, particularly high costs for businesses 
that are caused by terrorism or organized crime are likely to increase the number of 
STRs. We therefore assume that  
H5: Criminal activities increase the amount of STRs. 
We finally conjecture, that tax havens oppose disclosure of financial information 
and thus report relatively few suspicious transactions. This is in line with the notion 
that tax havens protect investor privacy (Schjelderup, 2016). Thus, we hypothesize 
that 
H6: Tax havens exhibit low STR levels. 
 
 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:1 2016                                            Drivers of Suspicious Transaction Reporting Levels 
 
110 
 
Regression analysis 
Data and methodology 
We set up a panel data set comprising 54 countries and perform regression analysis 
to investigate the hypotheses above. The choice of countries depends mainly on 
whether or not the countries publish their STR numbers. The sample thus contains 
very different economies from all continents, including 28 OECD countries, a 
number of middle-income countries such as India, the Philippines or the Senegal, 
large countries such as the United States and very small countries such as Malta, 
and also nine jurisdictions which are classified as tax havens.24 The full list of 
countries is included in Appendix A. 
The sample period spans the years 2006 to 2012. The average number of reports 
per country over the sample period 2006-2012 amounts to 55,568 STRs per year. 
The average number of STRs per country exhibits a large variance ranging from a 
maximum of over 1.3 million in the United States and a minimum of 76 in Senegal. 
On average, there are 94 STRs per USD one billion GDP over all countries and all 
years in our sample. The highest ratios are to be found in Thailand (1,623.3), Latvia 
(864.1) and Georgia (759.3), while Qatar has the lowest ratio with 1.3, followed by 
Switzerland (1.9) (see Table A). Due to the limited availability of STR data we do 
not have observations for all countries for all years of the sample period. The panel 
is thus unbalanced. 
To control for time-invariant country-specific factors (such as institutional and legal 
frameworks), fixed-effects estimations are used. These estimates, however, only 
give a picture on within-country variation over time. Hence, we additionally show 
random-effects estimates capturing some cross-country variation as well.  
As clearly visible in Figure 1, the number of STRs shows a steady upward trend 
over most of the sample period. Also, our sample period includes the years of the 
financial and economic crisis starting in 2008 which might affect STR levels. All 
regression models thus include year-fixed effects to control for a common time-
trend. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is 
the (natural logarithm of the) ratio of the number of STRs over GDP by a given 
country in a given year. The choice of explanatory variables is based on the 
hypotheses above. Summary statistics and correlation tables are presented in Tables 
C and D in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Singapore, and 
Switzerland (Gravelle, 2015). 
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RESULTS 
The baseline regression results with fixed effects are depicted in Table 1 below. 
Following hypothesis 1, we include a country’s GDP per capita (gdppc) in order to 
measure its level of economic development. This variable is highly correlated with 
a number of institutional variables such as corruption levels, the strength of the rule 
of law, the size of the shadow economy and state stability (hypothesis 1).25 We thus 
expect this variable to capture such institutional factors as well. However, against 
our expectations it is statistically not significant. This may be due to the ambiguous 
impact of institutional factors (captured by the gdppc variable) on reporting levels. 
We further account for the development of the financial sector, which we assume 
to have a positive impact on STR levels (hypothesis 2). We use a proxy to measure 
the size and depth of the financial sector: domestic credit as a percentage of GDP 
(credit). This variable has the expected positive sign, but proves, however, not to 
be statistically significant. Potential variables to measure the internationality of the 
financial sector would be the in- and outflows of foreign portfolio investments. 
These variables are, however, highly correlated with the GDP per capita and are 
thus not included in the regression.26 In line with hypothesis 3, we also include a 
proxy that captures the stringency of rules for the financial sector: an index 
measuring overall restrictions on banking activities (restrictiveness, columns (3) 
and (4)) and, alternatively, an index measuring the power of the supervisory 
authorities (supervision, columns (5) and (6)). Both are positive, but not statistically 
significant in our regressions. 
Based on hypothesis 4, we wish to capture the effects of the institutional framework 
of the FATF. FATF membership and in particular on-site visits of a FATF 
committee and the subsequent publication of a MER may increase STR levels. The 
regressions thus also include dummy variables that take the value of one in the year 
an MER is published (mer) or in the following respective years (mer(t+1), mer(t+2), 
mer(t+3)). The dummies are individually and also jointly statistically significant 
and positive. It thus seems that an on-site visit and the publication of the MER do 
indeed increase the numbers of STRs significantly. The effect seems quite sizeable.  
In the year following the publication of the report, the model predicts around a 
quarter more STRs, in the subsequent year a third more STRs than the country 
would have without an on-site visit and publication of a MER. In the third year the 
effect shrinks, but still amounts to 20%. Countries hence seem to react strongly to 
the MERs and increase their efforts to report more suspicious transactions (also see 
3.4). However, the increase seems not to be persistent, but rather to decrease after 
the second year. 
                                                 
25 Correlations are depicted in Appendix E. 
26 Correlations are depicted in Appendix E. 
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Table 1: Baseline Regressions: Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
gdppc (ln) -0.776 -0.393 -0.465 -0.002 -0.083 0.550 
 (0.200) (0.549) (0.419) (0.998) (0.883) (0.381) 
       
credit 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.448) (0.509) (0.829) (0.964) (0.924) (0.872) 
       
terrorism -0.468**  -0.588***  -0.515**  
 (0.020)  (0.003)  (0.013)  
       
organized  -0.319*  -0.341**  -0.352** 
crime  (0.051)  (0.036)  (0.039) 
       
restrictiveness   -0.005 0.006   
   (0.917) (0.918)   
       
supervision     0.029 0.048 
     (0.487) (0.282) 
       
mer   0.143** 0.128* 0.121* 0.093 
   (0.040) (0.085) (0.058) (0.140) 
       
mer (t+1)   0.270*** 0.256** 0.247** 0.227** 
   (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
       
mer (t+2)   0.343*** 0.355*** 0.325*** 0.346*** 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
       
mer (t+3)   0.187* 0.211** 0.189** 0.223** 
      (0.056) (0.047) (0.047) (0.037) 
       
observations 270 269 260 259 242 241 
       
countries 54 54 51 51 47 47 
       
R2 0.28 0.27 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 
       
F-test 3.02 3.70 4.20 4.77 4.79 6.27 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Joint   3.91 4.33 3.33 3.80 
significance 
mer (t+1) 
mer (t+2) 
mer (t+3) 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of the ratio of STRs to 
GDP. All regressions include time FE and country FE, and a constant. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level; p-values in parentheses; sample period: 2006-2012; *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; the number of years and observations varies 
due to limited data availability. 
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Moreover, we also try to account for the criminal activity taking place in a country, 
in particular terrorism (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and organized crime (columns (2), 
(4) and (6)), as we would expect that the numbers of STR vary with the extent of 
these activities in a country (hypothesis 5). We proxy these two variables using a 
yearly survey carried out by the World Economic Forum, which is available since 
2006.27 The questions asked in the survey are “In your country, to what extent does 
the threat of terrorism [organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion)] 
impose costs on businesses? The answer categories vary from “to a great extent [1] 
to “not at all” [7]. Higher numbers hence reflect a lower perceived threat of 
terrorism and organized crime respectively.Table 2 gives an overview on the top 
seven countries in our sample for which the survey indicates the highest/lowest 
costs for business due to terrorism and organized crime on average over time. 
Table 2: Top seven countries with highest/lowest costs reported due to terrorism and 
organized crime 
Indicator Countries 
highest costs due to terrorism 
Lebanon, United States, Nigeria, the Philippines, Turkey, 
India, Mexico 
lowest costs due to terrorism 
Finland, Slovakia, Iceland, Austria, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Czech Republic 
highest costs due to organized 
crime 
South Africa, Argentina, the Philippines, Turkey, Poland, 
United States, Croatia 
lowest costs due to organized 
crime 
Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Singapore, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Austria 
 
In the regressions, both variables show the expected sign and are statistically 
significant, indicating that in fact STR levels are associated with the extent of 
criminal activity taking place in a country. Even if the magnitude of the effects 
themselves are difficult to interpret, as terrorism and organized crime are measured 
as indices, and as it is not entirely clear what an increase in the index by one 
percentage point means in real terms, one can say that terrorism seems to be 
reflected in STR levels more strongly than organized crime. 28 
In addition to the fixed-effects estimations presented above, we also performed 
some random effects estimations (Table 3). Dismissing country-fixed effects allows 
capturing some cross-country variation and estimating the impact of factors that do 
not vary over time. Moreover, these regressions serve as robustness checks. The 
regressions in columns (1) to (4) predict similar outcomes when compared to the 
fixed-effects estimations above. Columns (5) and (6) show regression results 
including a tax haven dummy for the nine tax haven countries in our sample. In line 
                                                 
27 http://www.weforum.org/reports?filter[type]=Competitiveness. 
28 For illustrative purposes, a decrease by one percentage point in terrorism levels (as depicted by 
the data) would for instance be equivalent to a decrease from the level in Nigeria (index=3.7) to the 
Indian level (index=4.7). 
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with hypothesis 6, the results do indicate lower STR levels in these jurisdictions. 
The effect is however not statistically significant. 
In order to further assess the robustness of our results we re-run all regressions 
without the US, which is by far the country with the most STRs/SARs reported. As 
the results remain largely unchanged, we are confident that the identified variables 
actually affect STR levels (see Tables F and G in the appendix). 
Discussion of the econometric results 
Despite the fact that some authors question the reasonableness of AML/CFT 
regimes (e.g. Takats, 2011), our analysis suggests that they are effective in 
identifying terrorism and organized crime, as countries with higher crime rates file 
more STRs. Moreover, we find that FATF membership and mutual evaluations 
drive reporting levels. Assuming that peer pressure likely promotes compliance 
with FATF standards, this finding seems plausible: Countries that are labelled as 
non-compliant face reputational risk that might, for instance, discourage foreign 
investors. Somewhat surprisingly however, we do not observe significantly 
deviating reporting patterns for tax havens. While strict non-disclosure regulations 
and limited exchange of information seem to be reflected in low STR levels, this 
effect is not statistically significant.  
The regression results indicate conditional correlations, meaning they capture the 
effect of a specific variable while controlling for the effects of the other covariates 
in the regression. However, interpreting the outcomes in a causal way seems 
problematic, as it is conceivable that for some variables the causality runs in the 
opposite direction or in both directions. For instance, a country that already records 
a high level of terrorism might attract additional illicit money flows, which finance 
more terrorist activity (which are reflected in additional STRs).  
Also, measurement errors may lead to endogeneity concerns. In particular, the 
measurement of STRs seems problematic and the question arises as to whether 
STRs are actually comparable across countries. In other words, does an STR in the 
USA mean the same as an STR in Qatar? The legal analysis shows that due to the 
soft law nature of the FATF recommendations and their rather flexible 
implementation in the different countries the qualitative identity of STRs across 
countries is not given (see Sections 2 and 3). 
These endogeneity concerns may potentially lead to biased estimators, meaning that 
our results should be interpreted with some caution. It is not clear which factors are 
indicators and which factors are drivers of STRs. This problem is common in the 
literature on money laundering and the shadow economy, because - as in our case - 
measurement is difficult and there is no theory that guides the interpretation 
(Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro, 2010). Nevertheless, we hope that the links we 
find between the different factors contribute to the literature and may serve as a 
primer on which further research can build. 
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Table 3: Baseline Regressions: Random Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
gdppc (ln) -0.257 -0.145 -0.087 0.057 -0.086 0.057 
 (0.396) (0.653) (0.764) (0.856) (0.768) (0.854) 
       
credit 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.229) (0.233) (0.573) (0.552) (0.583) (0.569) 
       
terrorism -0.339*  -0.481***  -0.482***  
 (0.066)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
       
organized  -0.244*  -0.293**  -0.294** 
crime  (0.099)  (0.048)  (0.047) 
       
restrictiveness   -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 
   (0.805) (0.936) (0.804) (0.939) 
       
haven     -0.095 -0.018 
     (0.867) (0.971) 
       
mer   0.130** 0.119* 0.130** 0.119* 
   (0.045) (0.097) (0.046) (0.098) 
       
mer (t+1)   0.247** 0.237** 0.247** 0.238** 
   (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
       
mer (t+2)   0.334*** 0.338*** 0.334*** 0.338*** 
   (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
       
mer (t+3)   0.183** 0.194** 0.182** 0.194** 
      (0.038) (0.043) (0.037) (0.042) 
       
observations 270 269 260 259 260 259 
       
countries 54 54 51 51 51 51 
       
R2 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 
       
Wald test 37.65 29.68 60.79 77.80 61.27 77.38 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Joint   12.74 13.87 12.66 13.85 
significance 
mer (t+1) 
mer (t+2) 
mer (t+3) 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of the ratio of STRs to 
GDP. Random effects estimations, all regressions include time FE, and a constant. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in parentheses. Sample period 2006-2012. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. The number of years and 
observations varies due to the limited availability of some data. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In combining legal and economic methods this paper investigates the effects of 
various policies, institutional and legal factors on STR levels. As earlier research 
questions the effectiveness of AML/CFT frameworks in general (e.g. Takats, 2011), 
recently a lot of attention has been drawn to the discussion regarding which 
information high STR numbers actually conveys. And indeed, this question is 
difficult to answer. While high numbers of STRs ideally indicate high levels of 
suspicious activity or efficient monitoring systems, they might also reveal poorly-
targeted evaluation systems that provide incentives for over-reporting. 
Among the most important features of legal systems that drive numbers of STRs is 
the scope of predicate offenses in national criminal law. Moreover, sanctions for 
non-compliance with national AML/CFT legislation affect reporting levels. 
Depending on their design, sanctions may deter or encourage the filing of STRs. At 
worst, strict sanctions may lead to the phenomenon of “defensive reporting” or, on 
the contrary, cause a lack of reporting due to disproportionately high penalties. 
Therefore, adequate penalties for non-compliance with AML/CFT standards seem 
to be essential in the establishment of efficient reporting structures (Takats, 2011). 
At the same time it has to be noted that high levels of STRs are not necessarily 
proof of an effective AML/CFT regime. Over-reporting may frequently be a 
consequence of inefficient legal systems, overly broad definitions of predicate 
offenses, or poorly calibrated automated suspicious transaction identification 
systems. Additionally, overly severe penalties for non-compliance with reporting 
standards potentially trigger over-reporting. Thus, as demonstrated in the foregoing 
analysis, apparent over-reporting should be examined in detail in order to draw 
conclusions on the effectiveness of AML/CFT frameworks. 
The economic analysis partly confirms our hypotheses. In particular, we find that 
countries in which businesses face high costs due to terrorism or organized crime 
file more STRs. The supervision and reporting system therefore appears to be 
successful in detecting suspicious financial transactions related to money 
laundering and terrorism. Moreover, we find that the mutual evaluation framework 
increases reporting levels sustainably: countries report significantly more 
suspicious activity in the years following an evaluation. This indicates that the on-
going review process is crucial for the improvement of international compliance 
with the FATF Standard. In identifying deficiencies in countries’ STR regimes, the 
assessors apparently initiate reforms that increase compliance with the FATF 
recommendations and drive reporting levels. Consequently, mutual evaluation 
schemes should incorporate risk considerations and target those countries that are 
particularly vulnerable to criminal activities related to money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 
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Regarding countries’ economic and financial sector development, we do not 
observe any significant effects on STR levels. Also, we do not find any effects of 
financial sector regulation and, likewise, tax havens exhibit no divergent reporting 
patterns. However, as the results suggest that the global AML/CFT system 
successfully identifies activity linked to terrorism and organized crime, the capacity 
of regulatory and supervision regimes needs to be further strengthened in order to 
effectively and sustainably implement the FATF Recommendations (OECD, 2014). 
The review of the AML/CFT frameworks in the selected countries is useful in 
providing evidence on a possible correlation between STR levels and certain 
characteristics of national legal and institutional frameworks. This analysis is not 
sufficient to provide conclusive evidence on the extent of particular legal and 
institutional factors’ impact on reporting levels. Moreover, it does not evaluate the 
effectiveness of different STR regimes. However, it clearly demonstrates that 
certain characteristics of legal and institutional frameworks strongly affect the 
quantity of STRs.  
Our analyses do not cover some factors that are clearly relevant in the field of 
terrorism financing and money laundering. These include, for instance, cyber-
money such as bitcoins. As today only few AML/CFT regimes contain provisions 
on virtual currencies, FIUs should in the future be provided with efficient means to 
respond to the digitalization of economies.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A. List of Countries 
 
Country STR STR/GDP Country STR STR/GDP 
Argentina 3,507 7.3 Luxembourg 4,205 76.3 
Australia 36,590 32.0 Malta 92 11.0 
Austria 1,859 4.6 Mauritius 158 17.0 
Barbados 104 23.1 Mexico 49,085 43.2 
Belgium 17,267 34.9 Netherlands 33,704 40.0 
Bulgaria 746 15.2 New Zealand 4,249 34.2 
Canada 57,393 35.7 Nigeria 3,188 8.0 
Croatia 1,478 23.2 Norway 6,389 15.2 
Cyprus 336 13.2 Philippines 9,506 45.1 
Czech Republic 2,120 10.2 Poland 2,214 4.7 
Denmark 1,828 5.6 Portugal 1,017 4.2 
Estonia 5,552 254.7 Qatar 174 1.3 
Finland 19,879 78.3 Republic of Korea 165,824 148.7 
France 17,781 6.6 Romania 2,671 15.4 
Georgia 9,995 759.3 Senegal 76 6.1 
Germany 10,542 3.0 Serbia 2,449 61.8 
Greece 1,702 5.0 Singapore 16,471 59.0 
Hong Kong 17,739 78.2 Slovakia 2,344 25.9 
Hungary 7,421 53.0 Slovenia 275 5.7 
Iceland 377 24.1 South Africa 44,532 126.6 
India 11,537 6.6 Spain 2,906 1.9 
Ireland 12,488 56.3 Sweden 9,408 19.7 
Italy 30,282 14.0 Switzerland 1,118 1.9 
Japan 265,607 51.0 Thailand 495,018 1635.3 
Latvia 24,304 864.1 Turkey 9,834 13.1 
Lebanon 227 6.9 United Kingdom 249,031 95.6 
Lithuania 213 5.2 United States 1,325,874 88.8 
      
Note: STR and STR/GDP denote the average per country between 2006 and 2012 including 
all years where data are available. GDP is measured in billions USD. 
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B. Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variable Description and Source 
gdp (ln) 
 
Gross domestic product (GDP) measured in US dollars at current prices and 
current exchange rates. Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
gdppc (ln) GDP per capita measured in US dollars at current prices and current 
exchange rates. Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
ofpi (ln) and ifpi 
(ln) 
Outward and inward total portfolio investments, in US dollars at current 
prices and current exchange rates in millions. Source: FPI UNCTAD, 
UNCTADstat 
state fragility 
index  
Index combining scores on eight indicators measuring political and 
economic effectiveness and legitimacy. Index ranges from 0 “no fragility” 
to 25 “extreme fragility.” Source: Systemic Peace Institute 
claims(ln) and 
liabilities(ln) 
Total Claims and Liabilities reported by banking offices located in the 
specified country regardless of the nationality of the controlling parent, in 
millions of US dollars; Source: Bank for International Settlements 
credit Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP). Source: World 
Bank: World Development Indicators  
corruption Freedom from Corruption Index; The index ranges from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating lower levels of corruption. Source: Heritage 
Foundation 
shadow 
economy 
Size of the shadow economy (in % of GDP) available for 1999-2007. 
Source: Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro (2010). 
rule of law Percentile rank terms from 0 to 100, with higher values corresponding to 
better outcomes.29 Source: World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators 
restrictiveness Index ranging from 3 to 12, where higher values indicate more restrictive 
bank regulation.30 Source: World Bank Survey (Barth, Caprio & Levine, 
2013) 
supervision Index ranging from 0 to 14, where higher values indicate greater 
supervisory power.31 Source: World Bank Survey (Barth, Caprio & Levine, 
2013) 
terrorism Cost for Businesses caused by terrorism 
Survey question: In your country, to what extent does the threat of terrorism 
impose costs on businesses? [1 = to a great extent; 7 = not at all] Source: 
World Economic Forum: Global competitiveness index 
organized crime 
 
Cost for Businesses caused by organized crime 
Survey question: In your country, to what extent does organized crime 
(mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses? [1 = to 
a great extent; 7 = not at all] Source: World Economic Forum 
haven Binary variable taking the value 1 if a country is classified as a tax haven 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Gravelle (2015). 
mer Binary variable taking the value 1 if an MER is published on a country in a 
specific year (0 otherwise); Source: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
 
  
                                                 
29 Index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
30 Sum of three indices: The extent to which banks may engage in underwriting, brokering and 
dealing in securities, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry. + The extent to which banks may 
engage in insurance underwriting and selling. + The extent to which banks may engage in real estate 
investment, development and management. 
31 Whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and 
correct problems. 
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C. Summary statistics  
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
str/gdp (ln) 270 -3.97 1.59 -7.35 1.01 
gdppc (ln) 270 9.91 1.08 6.85 11.64 
credit 270 127.48 69.81 18.80 349.03 
supervision 242 10.79 2.48 3.00 14.69 
restrictiveness 260 6.73 1.70 2.25 12.00 
terrorism 270 5.67 0.77 2.60 6.80 
organized crime 269 5.61 0.91 2.69 6.85 
mer 260 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
mer (t+1) 260 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
mer (t+2) 260 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
mer (t+3) 260 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
haven 260 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
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D. Pairwise correlations  
 
 
str/gdp 
(ln) 
gdppc 
(ln) 
credit 
super- 
vision 
restric- 
tiveness 
terrorism 
organized 
crime 
mer 
mer 
(t+1) 
mer 
(t+2) 
mer 
(t+3) 
haven 
str/gdp (ln) 1.00            
gdppc 
0.06 1.00 
          
(ln)           
credit 0.15 0.50 1.00          
super- 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.08 1.00 
        
vision         
restric- 
-0.08 -0.29 -0.07 0.38 1.00 
       
tiveness        
terrorism -0.05 0.24 -0.11 -0.03 -0.13 1.00       
organized 
-0.07 0.52 0.24 -0.06 -0.26 0.52 1.00 
     
crime      
mer -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 1.00     
mer (t+1) 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.17 1.00    
mer (t+2) 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.16 1.00   
mer (t+3) 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 1.00  
haven 0.04 0.24 0.22 0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.32 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 1.00 
 
E. Correlations with GDP per capita 
  
gdppc (ln) 
 
corruption 
 
rule of law 
 
state fragility index 
 
shadow economy 
 
foreign portfolio 
investment flows 
(ln) 
gdppc (ln)  
1.00 
     
corruption 0.86 1.00     
rule of law 0.81 0.96 1.00    
state fragility index -0.75 -0.72 -0.72 1.00   
shadow economy -0.77 -0.76 -0.72 0.34 1.00  
foreign portfolio investment flows 
(ln) 
0.61 0.55 0.49 -0.28 -0.64 1.00 
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F. Regression Results without the United States (Fixed Effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
gdppc (ln) -0.812 -0.446 -0.487 -0.047 
 (0.188) (0.500) (0.408) (0.942) 
credit 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.0001 
 (0.478) (0.554) (0.836) (0.976) 
terrorism -0.464**  -0.595***  
 (0.023)  (0.003)  
organized crime  -0.347**  -0.363** 
  (0.034)  (0.030) 
restrictiveness   -0.005 0.010 
   (0.914) (0.854) 
mer   0.139** 0.111 
   (0.043) (0.117) 
mer (t+1)   0.271*** 0.239** 
   (0.010) (0.014) 
mer (t+2)   0.346*** 0.334*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) 
mer (t+3)   0.185 0.192 
      (0.105) (0.118) 
R2 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.35 
observations 263 262 253 252 
countries 53 53 50 50 
F-test 3.01 3.95 3.99 4.81 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Joint   3.46 3.58 
significance 
mer (t+1) 
mer (t+2) 
mer (t+3) 
    (0.02) (0.02) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of the ratio of STRs to 
GDP. All regressions include time FE and country FE, and a constant. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level; p-values in parentheses; sample period: 2006-2012; *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; the number of years and observations varies 
due to limited data availability. 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 2:1 2016                                            Drivers of Suspicious Transaction Reporting Levels 
 
125 
 
G. Regression Results without the United States (Random Effects) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
gdppc (ln) -0.268 -0.155 -0.095 0.043 
 (0.380) (0.632) (0.746) (0.892) 
credit 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.258) (0.290) (0.589) (0.601) 
terrorism -0.321*  -0.477***  
 (0.089)  (0.008)  
organized crime  -0.254*  -0.300** 
  (0.091)  (0.049) 
restrictiveness   -0.012 -0.002 
   (0.792) (0.964) 
mer   0.128** 0.105 
   (0.046) (0.130) 
mer (t+1)   0.248** 0.224** 
   (0.011) (0.017) 
mer (t+2)   0.336*** 0.321*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
mer (t+3)   0.181* 0.178 
      (0.072) (0.106) 
R2 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.34 
observations 263 262 253 252 
countries 53 53 50 50 
Wald-test 29.55 39.23 58.55 77.22 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Joint   11.55 11.73 
significance 
mer (t+1) 
mer (t+2) 
mer (t+3) 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of the ratio of STRs to 
GDP. Random effects estimations, all regressions include time FE, and a constant. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. 
P-values in parentheses. Sample period 2006-2012. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. The number of years and observations varies due to the limited 
availability of some data. 
 
 
